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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 11 July 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Israel, the occupying Power, has once again committed the crime of demolishing Palestinian homes in two separate attacks. Yesterday, during the early morning hours (Palestine time), Israeli army bulldozers accompanied by scores of armed soldiers destroyed 26 houses and 12 shops in the Rafah refugee camp, leaving more than 150 people homeless. The Israeli demolitions, which caused intense panic and fear among the residents of the camp, took place while they were sleeping. On Monday, 9 July 2001, Israeli bulldozers demolished 14 Palestinian homes in the Shufat refugee camp in Occupied East Jerusalem.

These criminal actions by the Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, are part of the ongoing Israeli bloody military campaign being waged against the Palestinian people since 28 September 2000. The government of Mr. Ariel Sharon is fully responsible for that campaign, including war crimes and State terrorism being committed against the Palestinian civilian population under occupation as well as all the ensuing results and consequences.

Furthermore, on Saturday, 7 July 2001, Israeli soldiers wilfully killed an 11-year-old Palestinian boy without any serious justification. In the same incident, Israeli soldiers seriously injured a 10-year-old and a 13-year-old boy. Israeli officials had to state that they were investigating the killing, a claim they have used on several occasions in the last few months but which has never materialized. Also, today, a Palestinian woman was killed when Israeli soldiers shot at a Palestinian taxi at a West Bank checkpoint. Again, this brutal killing occurred without any serious justification.

Since my last letter to you dated 5 July 2001 (A/ES-10/94-S/2001/669), I regret to inform you that Israeli occupying forces have killed three more Palestinians, including the above-mentioned martyrs, bringing the total number of Palestinian martyrs to 517. (The names of the martyrs are contained in the annex to

01-45212 (E) 120701

the present letter.) In addition, dozens more Palestinian civilians have suffered injuries, many severely, as a result of the violent actions and attacks carried out by Israeli occupying forces.

Moreover, I am writing this letter in follow-up to my previous 54 letters addressed to you regarding this grave and ongoing situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, dated from 29 September 2000 to 6 July 2001 (A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116; A/ES-10/48-S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1206; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7; A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33; A/ES-10/56-S/2001/50; A/ES-10/57-S/2001/101; A/ES-10/58-S/2001/131; A/ES-10/59-S/2001/156; A/ES-10/60-S/2001/175; A/ES-10/61-S/2001/189; A/ES-10/64-S/2001/209; A/ES-10/65-S/2001/226; A/ES-10/66-S/2001/239; A/ES-10/67-S/2001/255; A/ES-10/68-S/2001/284; A/ES-10/69-S/2001/295; A/ES-10/70-S/2001/304; A/ES-10/71-S/2001/314; A/ES-10/72-S/2001/332; A/ES-10/75-S/2001/352; A/ES-10/76-S/2001/372; A/ES-10/79-S/2001/418; A/ES-10/80-S/2001/432; A/ES-10/81-S/2001/447; A/ES-10/82-S/2001/463; A/ES-10/83-S/2001/471; A/ES-10/84-S/2001/479; A/ES-10/85-S/2001/486; A/ES-10/86-S/2001/496; A/ES-10/87-S/2001/504; A/ES-10/88-S/2001/508; A/ES-10/89-S/2001/544; A/ES-10/90-S/2001/586; A/ES-10/91-S/2001/605; A/ES-10/92-S/2001/629; A/ES-10/93-S/2001/657 and A/ES-10/94-S/2001/669).

The Israeli bloody military campaign, including Israeli war crimes and State terrorism against the Palestinian people, must be brought to an end before more lives are lost and greater destruction is caused. The international community, and the United Nations Security Council in particular, is duty-bound to take action regarding the ongoing tragic and dangerous situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. We once again reiterate our call to the Council to do that and to take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with international law, international humanitarian law and existing Palestinian-Israeli agreements.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as an official document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nasser **Al-Kidwa**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 11 July 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem* (Saturday, 7 July, through Wednesday, 11 July 2001)

Saturday, 7 July 2001

Khalil Ibrahim Al-Maghrabi (11 years old)

Wednesday, 10 July 2001

Nafez Aiesh Al-Nazr

Thursday, 11 July 2001

Rasmiah Al-Jabareen

* Total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 517.

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Letter dated 10 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you that towards the end of 2000 the Government of the Republic of Iraq requested the World Health Organization (WHO) to send a team of its specialists to Iraq to study the impact on health and the environment of the frequent use by the United States and the United Kingdom of depleted-uranium munitions during their military aggression against Iraq in 1991, the catastrophic effects of their use on man and the environment in the country, including a sharp increase in cases of cancer and congenital deformities, having come to light over the past 10 years.

WHO acceded to this request and sent a mission to Baghdad in January 2001 to discuss the matter with the Iraqi side. Agreement was reached that a team of specialists from the Iraqi Ministry of Health should visit WHO headquarters in Geneva to formulate an action plan for the conduct of various studies to establish a causal link between depleted-uranium munitions and the various cancers and birth defects whose incidence in Iraq had increased alarmingly subsequent to their use.

A delegation from the Iraqi Ministry of Health visited Geneva from 9 to 12 April 2001 and reached agreement with WHO on a course of action involving cooperation between the Ministry and WHO in conducting studies on the impact of depleted-uranium munitions. The visit of the WHO team to Iraq to put the final touches to the agreement was scheduled for the end of June 2001, and towards the end of that month WHO addressed a letter to the Iraqi Ministry of Health informing it that the mission would visit Iraq between 30 June and 6 July 2001 and giving the names of the members of the WHO team.

As the Iraqi side was preparing to receive the WHO mission, on 3 July 2001 WHO addressed the attached letter (see annex) to the Iraqi Ministry of Health informing it that the mission would be unable to come to Iraq because WHO had failed to obtain the relevant security clearances from the United Nations.

We were greatly surprised that the United Nations security coordinator should postpone this important visit for security reasons when the same official has given open clearances to huge numbers of international personnel to come to Iraq to work for the oil-for-food programme. There are more than 890 international staff members working in Iraq for the oil-for-food programme, and some of them have no qualifications and some have been sent to make money or because they are the friends of some United Nations official or other. Some of those sent under cover of

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the oil-for-food programme, moreover, engage in activities that are prejudicial to Iraq's security.

The decision by the United Nations Secretariat to postpone this visit for security reasons is just another indication of procrastination and bad faith on the part of those in the Secretariat who submit to United States hegemony when it is a matter of taking serious steps to do justice to Iraq and halt the suffering caused to its people by the embargo and by aggression.

The visit of the WHO team to Iraq is of major importance not only to Iraq, which is suffering from the catastrophic consequences of the use of depleted-uranium munitions, but also for the countries of the region. They are also facing imminent danger to their environment and population, especially those in or near whose territory are to be found remnants of armour destroyed by depleted-uranium projectiles. Account should also be taken of the fact that the impact will persist for generations to come if contamination is not eliminated and the environment in Iraq and the countries of the region is not cleansed of the remnants of this hazardous radiological weapon. This matter is also one of importance for the world as a whole, particularly since this weapon has been used again in Yugoslavia and against the people of Palestine.

We seek your urgent intervention and request that the WHO mission should be permitted to visit Iraq as soon as possible to implement its agreed mandate.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 10 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

This is to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your invitation, addressed on 20 June 2001 to the Director-General's Office, for a team from the World Health Organization (WHO) to visit Iraq in order to finalize project proposals for activities inserted in the framework for collaboration between WHO and Iraq agreed upon during our joint April meeting in Geneva.

As you have been informed through the WHO Representative in Baghdad, we had already undertaken the preparatory work to send the mission by the end of June 2001. Unfortunately, we have been held back by the lack of the necessary United Nations security clearances to visit Baghdad. As soon as this problem is resolved we can establish the dates for the mission.

The World Health Organization is eager to progress this joint activity, and is pleased to report that the equipment requested by the Minister of Health in his letter of 3 March 2001 for the needs of early detection of breast cancers has been processed after obtaining the clearance of the 661 Committee. We hope that these items will be reaching Iraq in the course of this month. In the same way the list requesting technical support and equipment which was hand-delivered by H.E. the Minister of Health during the World Health Assembly has been costed and will be transmitted to the United Nations in New York for the usual procedures.

With respect to the forthcoming WHO mission to Baghdad, and while waiting for the necessary security clearances to permit determination of new dates for the mission, we would like to receive the various project proposals in their draft form, as prepared by the Iraqi specialists, so that we can start immediately working on them, and adjusting the composition of the mission participants if necessary. It would be also helpful to receive a draft agenda for the visit and an indication on the composition of the Iraqi delegation that will work with the WHO mission on the project proposals.

Executive Director
Sustainable Development and Health Environments

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Letter dated 11 July 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 6 July 2001, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the attached communication to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

01-45356 (E) 120701

Annex

Letter dated 6 July 2001 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1088, I attach the monthly report on operations of the Stabilization Force (SFOR). I would appreciate your making this report available to the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Lord **Robertson** of Port Ellen

Enclosure

Monthly report to the United Nations on operations of the Stabilization Force (SFOR)

1. Over the reporting period (1-31 May 2001) there were just over 21,400 troops deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, with contributions from all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and from 15 non-NATO countries.

2. During the period under review, SFOR support was required during two violent incidents which occurred during ceremonies for the reconstruction of mosques in Trebinje and Banja Luka. In addition, activities relating to the so-called third entity issue continued to require the attention of SFOR.

3. The first of the two violent incidents took place in Trebinje on 5 May when a ceremony for the reconstruction of the Osman Pasa mosque was interrupted. The ceremony was cancelled after a public demonstration by Bosnian Serbs turned violent. SFOR support was requested by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the local authorities. A representative of OHR suffered a slight head injury.

4. The second incident took place in Banja Luka on 7 may during a ceremony to mark the laying of the foundation stone on the site of the Ferhadija mosque. Violent clashes occurred when 2,000 Bosnian Serbs rioted and threw tear gas grenades, stones and eggs at Bosniacs and high-ranking international officials. Some of the officials were trapped in the Islamic Community building and were eventually freed, with some help from the Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska. Thirty people were injured in the clashes, one of whom later died from his injuries, and seven buses were burned. Although SFOR forces were present to support the local police, they had been asked not to intervene since the local police had primary responsibility for security. The local police have so far identified 34 members of the crowd responsible for some of the violent incidents. Thirteen have received 7-20 days in prison, and another 21 are awaiting sentencing on serious charges.

5. A similar ceremony for the reconstruction of a mosque planned to take place in Stolac on 13 May was postponed. At least six other ceremonies are planned over the summer months.

6. Other incidents included the explosion of two bombs on the night of 15-16 May in the Bosnian Croat pocket of Vitez, one in the premises of the Social Democratic Party in Vitez and the other in the premises of the New Croat Initiative (NHI) in Novi Travnik. Although there was extensive damage, there were no casualties.

7. During the reporting period, SFOR continued operations to ensure a safe and secure environment throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina to counter actions of the Croat National Assembly/Croatian Democratic Union (HNS/HDZ) to create a third entity and to support loyal Croat elements of the Federation Army. On 14 May, SFOR disarmed some guards in Kiseljac disloyal to the Federation and handed over the Matolucic Maturica barracks to a guard force loyal to the Federation.

8. The situation may be beginning to normalize, however. On 16 May, the Federation Defence Minister concluded an agreement for the re-registering within

15 days of about 7,000 soldiers and officers who walked out in support of the creation of a third entity in March.

9. On 21 May, SFOR began operations in support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to account for all equipment limited by article IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement stored in weapons storage sites located throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

10. SFOR continues to assist the local police and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in monitoring the situation in the Sarajevo suburb of Dobrinja.

11. SFOR troops continued to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations, using ground and air patrols. Other operations included area security, monitoring the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, monitoring the Entity Armed Forces (EAF), conducting weapons storage site inspections, providing support to the international organizations in theatre, and collecting weapons and ammunition in the framework of Operation HARVEST.

Cooperation and compliance by the Parties

12. The situation in theatre remained relatively calm throughout the reporting period, with the entities in substantial compliance with the military provisions of the Peace Agreement.

13. Over the period, SFOR troops conducted 180 weapons storage site inspections: 70 Bosnian Serb, 40 Bosniac, 19 Bosnian Croat and 51 Federation.

14. SFOR troops monitored 427 training and movement activities: 291 Bosnian Serb; 86 Bosniac; 2 Bosnian Croat; and 48 Federation.

15. Over the period, a total of 445 mine-clearing activities were conducted: 145 Bosnian Serb, 180 Bosniac, 112 Bosnian Croat, and 8 Federation.

Cooperation with international organizations

16. Within capabilities and in accordance with its mandate, SFOR continues to provide assistance to the international organizations in theatre, including the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), IPTF, OHR, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OSCE and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

17. SFOR continues to support the efforts of OHR to establish common institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to monitor the situation in Dobrinja, and guard OHR offices in Mostar West and Trebinje.

18. SFOR continues to provide assistance to UNHCR in its efforts to encourage returns and to re-house refugees and assist non-governmental organizations and other international organizations on a variety of projects.

Outlook

19. Although the overall security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains under control, there is some tension due to the effects of HNS/HDZ activities to achieve a third entity and to protests against the rebuilding of mosques.

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Identical letters dated 10 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you that I have received instructions from my Government to convey to you of the following:

At 8.30 a.m. on 11 June 2001 a patrol of the Saudi Frontier Force at the Saddawi post in the Rafha' sector in the Kingdom's northern province saw a vehicle alongside the Iraqi berm but inside Saudi territory. The Saudi patrol was deployed in the direction of the vehicle in question. Seven persons were subsequently seen standing on the berm, and then three of them crossed it and penetrated 500 metres inside Saudi territory. When the Saudi Frontier Force patrol proceeded in their direction, those who had remained standing on the berm fired on it. The Saudi patrol exchanged fire with them, forcing them to take flight into Iraqi territory. When the scene of the incident was searched, contraband was found consisting of 45 double slabs of hashish weighing 44.653 kilograms.

The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia requests that the Iraqi authorities be urged to halt these violations of Saudi Arabia's borders and to prevent illegal entry into its territory, activities that seek to undermine security and stability in the area.

I should be grateful if you would bring this incident to the attention of the members of the Security Council and if you would have this letter circulated as a Council document.

(*Signed*) Fawzi Bin Abdul Majeed **Shobokshi**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Letter dated 9 July 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform the members of the Security Council that it is my intention to appoint General Lamine Cissé, former Minister of Interior of Senegal, as my Representative in the Central African Republic and Head of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office (BONUCA) in that country. He will take up his new functions later this month. General Cissé will succeed Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Sy, who resigned in May.

I should be grateful if you could bring the content of this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

01-45455 (E) 120701

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Letter dated 12 July 2001 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 9 July 2001 (S/2001/690) concerning your intention to appoint General Lamine Cissé, former Minister of Interior of Senegal, as your Representative in the Central African Republic and Head of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office (BONUCA) in that country has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention contained in your letter.

(*Signed*) **Wang** Yingfan
President of the Security Council

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Identical letters dated 12 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 10 July 2001 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. The Minister calls attention to the ongoing wanton aggression against Iraq by United States and British aircraft in the unlawful no-flight zones and to the fact that in the period from 22 to 30 June 2001 they carried out 275 sorties, 91 of them from Saudi Arabia, 116 from Kuwait and 68 from Turkey.

The Minister reaffirms the Government of Iraq's condemnation of these acts of aggression against Iraqi territory, and he states that international responsibility for them must be borne by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the countries that provide the logistic support for this aggression, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey. He urges you to perform the duties assigned to you under the Charter by halting this unwarranted aggression and ensuring that it does not recur.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 12 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

I should like to inform you that United States and British warplanes based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey have continued to violate the airspace of the Republic of Iraq. They carried out 275 sorties in the period from 22 to 30 June 2001, 91 of them from Saudi Arabia, 116 from Kuwait and 68 from Turkey, as shown hereunder.

1. In the northern region 68 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 12,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1130 hours on 25 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 14 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Dohuk, Irbil, Aqrah and Amadiyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1200 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1335 hours on 26 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 16 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Amadiyah, Dohuk, Irbil, Aqrah, Tall Afar and Rawanduz areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1520 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 1050 hours on 27 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 18 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Amadiyah, Baibo, Dohuk, Aqrah, Ayn Zalah, Sinjar, Tall Afar, Mosul, Rawanduz and Irbil areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1345 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 1130 hours on 29 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 20 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar, Amadiyah, Sinjar and Ayn Zalah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1500 hours, drove them off.

2. In the southern region 207 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 9,000 to 13,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 2110 hours on 22 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 47 missions, 33 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 14 from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the

Basrah, Jalibah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Shinafiyah, Ashbajah, Diwaniyah, Nukhayb, Qal'at Sukkar, Salman and Amghar areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 2400 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 2125 hours on 24 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out seven missions from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace and an AWACS aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Artawi, Umm Qasr and Busayyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 2300 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 2145 hours on 25 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 10 missions, six of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and four from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Amarah, Qal'at Sukkar, Jalibah, Lasaf, Shinafiyah, Ashbajah and Salman areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 2345 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 2130 hours on 26 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 45 missions, 10 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 35 from the Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Artawi, Busayyah, Basrah, Jalibah, Qal'at Salih, Amarah, Rumaythah, Nukhayb, Samawah, Diwaniyah, Rifa'i, Qal'at Sukkar and Qurnah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 2330 hours, drove them off.

(e) At 1250 hours on 28 June 2001, United States and British F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 14 missions, eight of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and six from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Busayyah, Salman and Ashbajah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1430 hours, drove them off.

(f) At 1200 hours on 29 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 53 missions, 24 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 29 from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Salman, Basrah, Amarah, Samawah, Nasiriyah, Diwaniyah, Najaf, Jalibah and

Artawi areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1450 hours, drove them off.

(g) At 1055 hours on 30 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 31 missions, 10 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 21 from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Qurnah, Diwaniyah, Samawah, Nasiriyah, Taqtaqanah, Qal'at Salih, Artawi, Jalibah and Lasaf areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1425 hours, drove them off.

This aggression illustrates the bellicose attitude being maintained by the United States of America and the United Kingdom towards Iraq. Since 1992, it has become a fixed policy aimed at undermining the country's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and at the systematic and concerted destruction of Iraqi lives, infrastructure and civilian installations. It is a policy that has been affirmed in successive statements made by United States and British officials.

The Government of Iraq categorically rejects the two so-called no-flight zones, which were imposed by unilateral decision of the United States and the United Kingdom and lack any legal basis. Iraq rejects all the consequences of this illegal decision and, in particular, the flimsy excuses and pretexts used by these States in an attempt to justify their military aggression against our country.

The logistic support provided by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey to the Americans and the British has made these countries key partners in the aggression being committed against Iraq, so that they bear full international responsibility under international law. This includes liability for full compensation for the loss and damage, in both human and material terms, that is caused by these illegal practices.

The Government of Iraq further renews its call to the countries participating in this aggression to desist forthwith from internationally prohibited acts that violate Iraq's sovereignty, place its security and integrity in grave danger and pose a direct and serious threat to international peace and security.

As it condemns these acts of aggression against Iraqi targets and installations, the Government of Iraq urges you to perform the duties assigned to you [under the Charter] as they relate to the maintenance of international peace and security by intervening with the governments of the countries in question with a view to inducing them to halt, end and desist from any resumption of their constant and unwarranted aggression against an independent, sovereign State.

(*Signed*) Tariq **Aziz**
Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

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Letter dated 12 July 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Members of the Security Council will recall that, following the submission of the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (S/2000/915) on 4 October 2000, letters were exchanged between the Council and the Secretary-General on 22 December 2000 (S/2000/1234), 12 January 2001 (S/2001/40) and 31 January 2001 (S/2001/95), which led to modifications in the text of both the draft Agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone and the draft statute of the Court. The Government of Sierra Leone was consulted on these changes and by letter of 9 February 2001 to the Legal Counsel expressed its willingness to accept the texts.

As agreed, however, between members of the Council and the Secretary-General, implementation of the revised Agreement would commence only after it could be ascertained that sufficient contributions were in hand to finance the establishment of the Court and 12 months of its operation, and pledges equal to the anticipated expenses of the following 24 months. At that time also, the Secretary-General and the Government of Sierra Leone would conclude the Agreement on the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, thus establishing the legal framework for the commencement of the operation.

On 23 March 2001, I launched an appeal to all States to make contributions in funds, personnel and services to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The estimated requirements for the establishment and first year of operation of the Court and for the following 24 months, based on the application of the United Nations Financial Regulations and Rules and the Staff Regulations and Rules, amounted to $30.2 million and $84.4 million, respectively, and a total of $114.6 million.

With the start of the appeal period of 60 days, a process of regular informal consultations between the Secretariat and a group of interested States was initiated by the Legal Counsel. The purpose of those consultations was to discuss the practical arrangements for the establishment and operation of the Special Court, in particular the establishment of a Management Committee, elements of the budget estimates, the level of posts and scale of salaries for international and local personnel, and premises for the Court. In the course of these meetings it became apparent that the financial parameters had been substantially reduced, and that the amount of contributions likely to be made available for the start-up phase and the first year of operation of the Court would range between $15 million and $18 million only.

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Concerned about the viability of a Special Court budgeted at a reduced level, I invited the 15 members of the Security Council to an informal meeting on 1 June 2001. Different views were expressed at that meeting on the need to downsize the operation of the Special Court commensurate with the amount of funds likely to be made available. Members of the Council reiterated their understanding that, without prejudice to the independence of the Prosecutor, the personal jurisdiction of the Special Court remains limited to the few who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes committed. At my suggestion, it was agreed to continue the discussion on revising the concept of operation of the Special Court in a small working group consisting of interested States and a Secretariat team. On 14 June 2001, the Secretariat presented to the group of interested States revised budget estimates amounting approximately to $57 million for the first three years of operation of the Court, with $16.8 million for the first year.

The revised budget estimates reflect a scaled-down operation of the Special Court, while maintaining its nature and sui generis character, international standards of justice and the applicable law. A combination of factors including a different basis for calculation of salaries, a reduction in the normal rates of programme backstopping and contingency requirements, as well as a reliance on Sierra Leonean institutions and personnel, and on UNAMSIL administrative and security capacity, at least in the initial start-up phase, resulted in the reduction of the budget estimates.

On the basis of the revised budget, I renewed on 18 June 2001 the appeal for States to indicate by 29 June 2001 what contributions in funds, personnel, equipment and services they would be willing to make for the establishment and first 12 months of operation of the Special Court, and pledges for the following 24 months. In that appeal, I underlined the importance of appointing a Prosecutor, prosecutorial and investigative staff, a Registrar, and Judges for the Trial and the Appeals Chambers. Nominations or contributions of any or all such personnel were welcomed.

As at 6 July 2001, the Secretariat has received indications of contributions in funds for the first year of operation of the Special Court in the amount of $15 million — a shortfall of approximately $1.8 million — and pledges for the following 24 months in the amount of approximately $20.4 million — a shortfall of approximately $19.6 million for the second and third years. Very limited contributions of personnel have been offered. In addition, one State offered an in-kind contribution of furniture.

Considering that the amount of contributions obtained is sufficient to commence the establishment and operation of the Special Court according to the scaled-down concept of operation, I intend to circulate a letter to the countries which have made pledges for the first three years of operation of the Special Court, and request that they deposit their contributions for the first year into a Trust Fund within 30 days. When funds are available in the pledged amount in the Trust Fund, I will ask the Legal Counsel to conclude on behalf of the United Nations the Agreement on the Establishment of the Special Court with the Government of Sierra Leone. I also intend to dispatch a planning mission to Freetown to discuss with the Sierra Leonean authorities the practical implementation of the Agreement and the kind and scope of contributions expected in Sierra Leonean personnel and services, and to lay the ground work for the arrival of the advance elements of the Special Court, consisting of the nucleus of its administrative and prosecutorial staff.

In ascertaining the sufficiency of funds to commence the establishment and operation of the Special Court, I remain conscious of the difficulties inherent in securing funding on the basis of voluntary contributions. I therefore reserve the right to revert to the Council at any time in the course of the operation of the Special Court and ask it to reconsider alternate means of financing the Court. Once the Special Court is established, Member States have a responsibility to ensure that sufficient resources are available to secure the completion of proceedings against those indicted.

I would appreciate the concurrence of the Council with the proposed approach.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

United Nations S/2001/694

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 July 2001
English
Original: French

Letter dated 13 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that at the weekly meeting last weekend of the Executive Committee of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD-Goma), its spokesman, reacting to hundreds of small traders who have been demonstrating day and night since 4 July 2001 in front of its headquarters at Goma, outrageously described the structures of this so-called rebel movement as a "State".

This description is extremely serious, in that it indicates the now openly proclaimed desire of Rwanda and RCD-Goma to create a secessionist State in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, contrary to the will of the Congolese people which achieved national concord on 30 June 1960.

This hidden agenda of Rwanda and RCD-Goma was drawn up in violation of the founding principles of the charter of the Organization of African Unity regarding the inviolability of the borders that emerged from decolonization, and in violation also of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as of the relevant provisions of all the resolutions of the Security Council, which have all reaffirmed the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of all the States of the region.

My Government recalls that on 31 August 1998 it addressed to the Security Council a memorandum on the armed aggression by the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in which it alerted the entire international community to the hegemonist and irredentist designs of Rwanda against the Democratic Republic of the Congo whereby the authorities currently in power in Rwanda see in a possible annexation of the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo a means of relieving Rwanda of part of its population.

These expansionist designs are also accompanied by an objective of dividing Africa up again with a view to establishing micro-States for purposes, inter alia, of controlling important sources of raw materials.

My Government calls on the Security Council, as a matter of urgency, to address a strong, clear and unambiguous message to Rwanda and RCD-Goma to refrain from any action that could sanction the secession and the partition of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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Lastly, with respect to the claims brought against RCD-Goma by the hundreds of small traders, the vast majority of whom are from Kasai-Oriental province, my Government calls on the Security Council to invite Rwanda and RCD-Goma to conduct themselves more fittingly, to take a more appropriate attitude towards the Congolese population and to restore unconditionally all the goods confiscated at Goma airport.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Atoki **Ileka**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2001/695

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 July 2001

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the humanitarian implications of the measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) on Afghanistan

I. Introduction

1. In resolution 1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000, the Security Council requested me to report periodically on the humanitarian implications of sanctions against Afghanistan. A first report, covering the first 60 days of sanctions under resolution 1333 (2000) and outlining reporting methodology, was submitted on 20 March 2001 (S/2001/241).

2. The present report is a mid-term review using the same methodology as my previous report. It identifies several adverse conditions that result from the sanctions regime. It concludes however that these effects are limited in comparison to other hardships currently faced by Afghanistan's population. The primary cause of human suffering in Afghanistan is the ongoing conflict, exacerbated substantially by the drought and widespread human rights abuses.

II. Profile of vulnerability

3. The overall vulnerability in Afghanistan is established as a baseline against which the humanitarian implications of the United Nations sanctions can be assessed. The profile of vulnerability includes assessments of the economy, public health, food security and nutrition, population displacement and the extent of the population's reliance on humanitarian assistance for survival.

4. The vulnerability profile indicates that the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is characterized by:

(a) Chronic poverty and lack of development;

(b) An acute food crisis;

(c) A collapsed economy;

(d) A high level of dependence on humanitarian assistance.

A. Economic situation



Figure 1

5. Figure 1 shows the depreciation of the Afghani versus the United States dollar in both real and percentage terms. The exchange rate has depreciated over time, leading to chronic local price inflation. There has, however, been no evidence of an actual collapse of the exchange rate or any threat of hyperinflation since the arrival of the Taliban in Kabul in 1996.

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6. The labour market shows the clearest indicators of the impact of drought, conflict, deprivation of human rights and mass displacement on the ability of the population to meet its basic needs. Real wages, as measured by the purchasing power of money wages, have declined since 1999. The drought has forced many new people into the labour market and almost 100,000 public sector workers have lost their jobs since 1999. The unemployment rate in Faizabad is 66 per cent, and even prosperous Herat has 36 per cent unemployment.



Figure 2

7. Official exports have fallen from $688 million in 1993, to $111 million in 2000, and the ongoing drought has prevented the agricultural sector from contributing to export recovery.

8. A large illicit economy developed during the war and official estimates of the level of trade or economic activity are underestimated. Unofficial exports and imports represent the most significant part of Afghanistan's illicit economy. The latest published indicator of the extent of the illicit economy is the estimate of the transit trade (smuggling) to other countries, principally to Pakistan at an estimated value of $941 million. The most significant recent development in this area has been the enforcement of the ban on opium poppy cultivation. This has drastically reduced the income of farmers and agricultural labourers.

B. Public health situation

9. The public health situation in Afghanistan is critical, with women and children being the most vulnerable. Infant and child mortality rates have remained roughly stable in Afghanistan in a period when other least developed countries have reduced their child mortality rates. A key factor inhibiting progress in public health has been the lack of resources. Only $2 million from the annual government budget of $70 million is devoted to health. This means an annual health expenditure of 10 cents per person. In essence, responsibility for health has been left to the individual and humanitarian assistance.

C. Food security and nutrition

10. Food production has collapsed in Afghanistan in the last three years. In 1998, Afghanistan required 1,100,000 metric tons of grain imports; this grew to 2,178,000 metric tons in 2000. This food gap has been partially covered by food aid (167,000 metric tons), and imports from neighbouring countries (364,000 metric tons).

11. Now, in the third year of drought, coping mechanisms are under further stress, in particular as many households have already disposed of their assets. Therefore, acute food insecurity has become the main focus of the international assistance efforts. The latest crop assessment mission, carried out by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) in spring 2001, concluded that "there is mounting evidence of emerging widespread famine conditions in the country, reflecting substantially reduced food intakes, collapse of the purchasing power of the people, distress sales of livestock, large-scale depletion of personal assets, soaring food grain prices, rapidly increasing numbers of destitute people and ever-swelling ranks of refugees and internally displaced persons".

D. Population displacement

12. The most visible manifestation of the latest humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan has been the massive increase in population displacement. During 2000 and 2001 displacement occurred in Afghanistan on a scale unseen since the conflicts in Kabul of 1992/93 and 1994/95. The newly displaced have fled

conflict, drought, or deliberate abuses by the authorities (forced displacement). The 850,000 newly displaced represent three times the number seen in 1999. The burden of caring for the displaced people has fallen on host communities and the international assistance agencies.

Displacement: Key indicators

Type of population movement	*People*
Displaced movement — newly displaced people, since summer 2000	850 000
Newly arrived refugees in Pakistan	170 000
Newly arrived refugees in the Islamic Republic of Iran	200 000
Total repatriations 2001	293 000
Total estimated refugee population in surrounding countries	3 695 000

E. Humanitarian assistance

13. Humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan is currently focused on life-saving interventions. Assistance amounts to more than five times the annual State budget, and essentially provides the only safety net for Afghans. As the drought and conflict continue, it is likely that this dependence will increase as other coping mechanisms are exhausted. In the absence of alternative social safety nets, protection of the ability of international humanitarian agencies to render assistance is key to the welfare of the Afghan population.

III. Causal studies

A. Introduction

14. The causal analysis consists of a series of case studies focusing on specific aspects of the humanitarian situation where there may be an identifiable impact of the sanctions. These case studies are designed to follow the chain of causality to test whether indeed any deterioration in the humanitarian situation has occurred and whether this is attributable to the sanctions regime or to other factors.

B. Humanitarian operating environment

15. The period of sanctions has coincided with a series of adverse changes in the humanitarian operating environment (humanitarian space) in Afghanistan. Humanitarian agencies are concerned about their ability to continue to render assistance given the current trend of events. That this comes at a time of unprecedented humanitarian need in Afghanistan is a source of vital concern.

16. The present report considers the extent to which the reduced humanitarian space has resulted from the response of the Taliban authorities to the imposition of United Nations sanctions.

17. Adverse developments have included legislative acts, negotiating stances adopted by the authorities, changes in administrative procedures, deliberate restriction of access to humanitarian assistance, quasi-legal acts of the Taliban authorities against aid projects and personnel and rhetorical attacks on aid agencies.

18. The highest profile restrictions on the humanitarian space have been the legislative acts, principally Edict 8 of August 2000, which banned Afghan female employment except in the Taliban-controlled health sector. Other examples of legislative action are the order issued in May 2001 to ban females (including female aid agency personnel) from driving automobiles; the restrictions on secular education issued in April 2001; and the proposed application of the Taliban religious code to foreigners. An example of the adverse administrative procedures imposed by the Taliban is the increase in the time required to obtain visas for aid personnel working in Afghanistan, from one week up to four weeks, which has obviously reduced the flexibility and mobility of international staff. Furthermore, since spring 2001, arrests of humanitarian staff by Taliban forces and raids conducted by the religious police on hospitals have increased. The Taliban authorities have also proved to be exceptionally difficult in the negotiations with WFP to reach an agreement on evaluating the needs of the beneficiaries of WFP's Kabul bakery project. Moreover, Taliban authorities continue to deny permission for aid deliveries to opposition-controlled areas, and to restrict polio vaccinations. Additionally, aid project managers have repeatedly been subjected to coercion and abusive behaviour by the Taliban authorities.

19. The majority of these restrictions have been initiated within the official structure of the Taliban movement and at a relatively high level. This indicates some form of official endorsement of the process of restricting the ability of the humanitarian agencies to operate.

20. The humanitarian consequences of the increasingly difficult operating environment include: reduced ability to work with or access women; inability to reach populations that are a low priority for the Taliban authorities; and generally increased costs or difficulty in implementing assistance projects to the extent that otherwise viable projects have to be considered for closure. A continued deterioration of the operating conditions, to the extent where staff security cannot be assured, could ultimately force aid agencies to withdraw and suspend operations.

21. The key factor linking all the major restrictions in the humanitarian operating environment is that they are manifestations of the relationship between the Taliban authorities and the humanitarian agencies. These repeated assaults on humanitarian action became more frequent after the imposition of resolution 1333 (2000). They occurred in a period during which the Taliban frequently articulated complaints against the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions. This sequence of events shows that reactions to sanctions by the Taliban authorities contributed to the operating difficulties of the humanitarian agencies. The decline in respect for humanitarian principles and for humanitarian agencies, however, occurred within a complex political environment. Other factors, such as internal political developments within the Taliban movement and conflicting interpretations by the Taliban of the principles that should underpin humanitarian action, also served to undermine relations between the humanitarian agencies and the Taliban authorities. They must rank alongside the United Nations sanctions as contributory causes to the problems faced by the humanitarian agencies.

C. Civil aviation and transport safety

22. My previous report (S/2001/241) indicated that the aviation restrictions imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) had presented difficulties for the maintenance of the aircraft fleet of Ariana Afghan Airlines and that this risked compromising aviation safety, including the safety of passengers who travel domestically on Ariana. The monitoring mechanism was charged with further investigating the issue to examine the precise nature of the constraints on Ariana and to propose mechanisms to overcome the problem of aviation safety.

23. Ariana is operating five Antonov 24 (AN-24) civilian aircraft for its domestic flights. Their recommended maintenance schedule includes a complete overhaul (D-check) after 1,800 flying hours, which would likely be a one-off check for each Antonov aircraft of Ariana's fleet during the lifespan of the current sanctions regime.

24. All five of the AN-24 aircraft were due for D-checks in May 2001. No facilities exist for these extensive overhauls within Afghanistan. Ariana has arrangements to conduct such checks in Karachi, with ZASAF Aviation, at a cost of approximately US$ 100,000 per plane. It is recommended that the Sanctions Committee consider issuing exemptions for Ariana Airlines to fly each Antonov to Karachi, in rotation, as soon as possible, so as to conduct the required overhauls.

25. The same requirements apply for the three Boeing 727 aircraft operated by Ariana. They need a partial overhaul (C-check) every 12 months and a complete overhaul (D-check) every 15,000 flying hours, which corresponds to one D-check every four to five years.

26. One of the Boeing 727s (YA-FAY) was due for a D-check in May 2001 and another (YA-FAU) is due for the same complete overhaul in July 2001. There are no facilities for these procedures in Afghanistan. However, Ariana has a maintenance arrangement with Royal Jordanian Airlines, in Amman, for this maintenance. The total cost of the procedure is $4 million per aircraft. These overhauls are only required once for each aircraft during the current sanctions regime. Accordingly, it is proposed that, upon request from Ariana, the Sanctions Committee issue the necessary exemptions.

27. A further obstacle to international flights by Ariana has arisen, which will even constrain the company from availing itself of any Sanctions Committee exemptions. The insurer of Ariana has cancelled the insurance policy of the three Boeing aircraft used for international flights. The insurance broker has cited the United Nations sanctions as the reason for the cancellation of the policy on grounds that the broker could not settle any claims by making

payments to a frozen account. It is therefore recommended that the Sanctions Committee establish regulations with respect to airline insurance.

28. In addition to its maintenance requirements, Ariana also requires access to spare parts and consumables that are not available in Afghanistan, and some of them (including aircraft engines) are recommended to be transported by air. Ariana has previously proposed airlifting of a set of spare parts for its Boeing fleet from Dubai, but it was not issued the needed exemptions for that purpose. During the monitoring process, discussions were held with both Ariana Afghan Airlines and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to identify a workable mechanism whereby any such requests for spare parts could be certified by IATA to assure that they comply with actual maintenance requirements of the identified civilian Ariana aircraft and thus facilitating the work of the Sanctions Committee in granting exemptions for the air transport of these spare parts. On the basis of these discussions it is proposed that Ariana be advised to route all applications for air transport of spare parts through IATA, which will forward the applications to the Sanctions Committee, with their certification that the spare parts are required for civilian aircraft maintenance.

29. In addition to its physical inventory, Ariana's safe and legal operation also depends on its ability to retain key flight crew members and to ensure that they perform the required number of flight hours. The flight crew, including captains, first officers, flight engineers and flight attendants, are, according to standard operating procedures, obliged to have regular flight simulator training. Therefore, it is recommended that IATA forward the recommended schedule for such training to the Sanctions Committee and that, based on certification by IATA, the Sanctions Committee consider applications from Ariana for flight ban exemptions to allow crew members to attend simulator training abroad.

30. Ariana will only be able to proceed with essential maintenance and crew training if a mechanism can be found to enable the company to finance these activities. Therefore, it is recommended that the Sanctions Committee authorize supervised access to frozen funds for the finance of approved maintenance work and crew training.

D. International trade: imports and exports

31. The sanctions regime has direct implications for Afghanistan's international trade because it has targeted international flights, which were previously used for transporting traded goods. However, the scale of the impact had been limited by the fact that most of Afghanistan's commodity imports and exports were already transported by surface, even before the air restrictions.

32. Total imports to Afghanistan in 2000 were estimated at 1.6 million tons (valued at approximately $1,211 million). Total exports and re-exports from Afghanistan were estimated at 1.5 million tons (valued at approximately $1,227 million). In both cases, transit trade dominated the figures. In value terms, 11 per cent of the exports are of indigenous products and 34 per cent of imports are for domestic consumption (World Bank 2001). The Ariana Afghan Airlines freight capacity, up until 1999, when it operated scheduled flights to Amritsar, India, and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, represented approximately 0.3 per cent of the total movement of imports and exports. Therefore, only a small proportion of international trade was transported by air and has thus been affected by the air embargo. In value terms, the percentage may be higher because the air freight service specialized in high value, low bulk goods, but it is unlikely to have been more than 1 per cent of total exports by value in any case.

33. The export of fresh fruit to Dubai is one of the few sectors that are particularly affected by the air restrictions. During 1998 and 1999, Afghan traders supplied fresh fruits to markets in the Gulf, using the airfreight service of Ariana to Dubai. A total of 405 metric tons was exported in the two years prior to the imposition of the aviation restrictions, against an initial investment of $264,000. The fruits comprised apricots, fresh almonds, pomegranates, grapes, melons and apples. Market analysis and freight capacity indicated that there was potential to expand this trade significantly. However, after imposition of resolution 1267 (1999), the trade was suspended. The loss of the air route has meant that sales are now restricted to the low-price domestic market, which has resulted in a loss of local income and employment.

34. In overall terms, it is clear that the air restrictions have not been a major factor in determining the volume

and direction of Afghanistan's international trade. Nonetheless, the effects that have been noted have been negative, serving to deter trade in goods for which airfreight was the preferable form of transport.

E. Analysis of commodities and exchange markets

35. Monitoring of key commodity markets and exchange rates in the six months after the adoption of resolution 1333 (2000) indicates that the sanctions regime imposed on Afghanistan has not caused any price inflation in basic commodities. The initial rapid depreciation of the Afghan currency against the United States dollar observed between December 2000 and February 2001 and reported in the March review (S/2001/241) was followed by a stabilizing of exchange rates. By the end of the review period, the Afghan currency was above its trend position (it depreciated by 1.4 per cent per month during the period from the end of November 2000 to the end of May 2001, compared to a previous monthly depreciation of 2.8 per cent). The strengthening of the exchange rate from March 2001 (the Afghani recovered 9 per cent of its value against the United States dollar between March and June) is consistent with the analysis presented in my previous report (S/2001/241), which indicated that the fall in the exchange rate in December and January was a once-off market adjustment to the announcement of the adoption and imposition of United Nations sanctions.

36. In summary, the sanctions have not had any long-term adverse effects on the functioning of the main commodities markets in Afghanistan.

F. Investment climate

37. While neither resolution 1267 (1999) nor 1333 (2000) includes measures directly prohibiting investment in Afghanistan, aspects of the sanctions regime may create disincentive to domestic or foreign investment. Possible obstructions to investment identified in the sanctions regime include:

(a) The freezing of Taliban assets has caused suspension of all international banking activities of the Afghan public sector banks and made transfers favouring organs of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan illegal;

(b) The ban on international flights has eliminated commercial freight and passenger connections to Afghanistan, a major obstacle to many international business activities;

(c) The existence of a sanctions regime may affect overall investor confidence because of the expectation of political instability or of further coercive measures.

38. The Private Sector Investment Bureau of the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Industries has registered some 1,015 possible investment projects nationally over the past four years. Of these, 305 have become active. Investors who have withdrawn from projects which were otherwise, ostensibly, proceeding, include:

(a) The oil and gas exploration project of the Greek company Consolidated Constructor Company, in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces;

(b) The rehabilitation of the Herat cement factory;

(c) The expansion of the Pul I Khumri cement factory.

39. The Consolidated Constructor Company project seems to be the clearest example of a viable project abandoned owing to the imposition of United Nations sanctions. It was suspended on 19 January 2001 after the imposition of resolution 1333 (2000). A 17-month preliminary survey had been conducted in the two provinces, with an initial investment of $1 million. The second phase (seismic survey), planned with an investment of $12 million over 18 months, was cancelled. The primary reason for the abandonment of the Consolidated Constructor Company project was that the survey depended on the operation of a light aircraft, which the company felt was impossible under the current aviation restrictions. The secondary reason for the abandonment was the anticipated difficulty of retaining international staff in a country under United Nations sanctions without any air links.

40. In the case of the cement factory in Herat, Czech investors had been involved in negotiations regarding rehabilitation and expansion of the plant but withdrew from the negotiations in January 2001, citing the tightening of United Nations sanctions as the main reason.

41. Officials of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan also claimed that they had been involved in discussions

with an investment bank in Dubai to establish a $500 million investment portfolio for allocation to projects in Afghanistan but that the bank withdrew from the negotiations after the imposition of the United Nations sanctions.

42. Certain investment activities have proceeded. There has been a limited international investment even under the current sanctions regime, especially in telecommunications. However, the investors face numerous hurdles, some of them arising from the sanctions regime. Investors in telecommunications, in particular, have complained of sanctions-related restrictions, including lack of an air freight service for transport of fragile equipment, lack of access to international flights for personnel, difficulty in obtaining export documentation for equipment in countries of origin and the lack of formal facilities for money transfer.

43. There has also been some limited investment from Pakistan businessmen, particularly in minerals development. Local investors have been able to invest in a range of trade and production activities without being deterred by the United Nations sanctions.

44. Even in cases where potential investors cite sanctions as a reason for not investing, the reality may be a complex combination of political-environmental and practical factors related to the sanctions. The United Nations sanctions regime represents one factor in an overall environment that is increasingly discouraging to investors.

G. Afghan banking sector

45. Resolution 1267 (1999) froze overseas assets of the Taliban movement and banned financial transactions with the movement. However, in implementation of the resolution, the freeze has been applied to the entire Afghan public sector, including the Afghan public sector banks. Afghanistan's overseas assets and accounts have been frozen and transactions favouring the Afghan public sector have been banned. In effect, the freezing of assets implemented through resolution 1267 (1999) represents a form of banking embargo on Afghanistan.

46. The direct humanitarian implications of the freezing of Taliban-related bank accounts have been minimal, because confidence in and use of the banks was already low prior to the introduction of sanctions. Up until 1992, humanitarian agencies relied on the Afghan banks for the transfer of funds to and within the country. During the conflict in the cities from 1992 until 1996, the humanitarian agencies were forced to follow the example of the Afghan private sector and shift to reliance on informal alternative financial service providers. Many assistance agencies retain a base in a neighbouring country, in particular in Pakistan, to support their operations in Afghanistan. This allows them to use the informal financial providers that operate between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The sanctions have consolidated this pattern and effectively ruled out the option of assistance agencies reverting to use of Afghan banks for the transfer of funds to their in-country operations. In effect, maintaining a bank account in a neighbouring country has become a prerequisite for any assistance agency operating in Afghanistan.

47. The Afghan public sector relied on the banks for the settlement of international payment up until the imposition of resolution 1267 (1999). Since then, government departments have either ceased international dealings or switched to the same informal channels used by the private sector, or have switched to using private overseas bank accounts. In this sense the sanctions regime has contributed to the decapitalization of the Afghan banks and has helped to promote undocumented, clandestine or informal sector financial dealings.

H. The armed conflict

48. The findings cited in my previous report (S/2001/241) continue to be valid. Although the sanctions were intended to reduce the flow of arms, the intensity of war shows no signs of diminishing and the conflict continued at a high level during the first six months of 2001. From the time when the sanctions were imposed, the parties to the conflict do not appear to have altered their military stance or their willingness to continue fighting. The only way that the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan can be substantially addressed is if the attitude and ability of the parties to the conflict change and an effective peace process is allowed to proceed. The humanitarian consequences of the conflict have re-confirmed war as the major cause of human suffering in Afghanistan. The ongoing fighting is the main cause for the unprecedented number of internally displaced persons

and the new influx of refugees to Pakistan. All regions of the country, with the exception of the southern region, now include active conflict zones.

I. Availability of essential drugs

49. The ban on international flights to Afghanistan has the potential to reduce availability of essential drugs by cutting off one possible means of importing medicine.

50. A number of pharmaceutical importers and aid agencies were asked whether this had, in fact, occurred. They reported that all supply problems had been addressed by diverting to surface routes. Therefore, there was no evidence that the availability of essential drugs had been affected by the sanctions regime.

51. Drug prices have moved broadly in line with other commodities that were not transported by air. From a representative basket of essential drugs considered, most have experienced a decline in dollar equivalent prices since the imposition of sanctions in 1999 and a moderate rise in Afghani denominated prices. There has been no evidence of different price trends for drugs from different countries of origin. There is also no evidence that sanctions have affected medicine prices, other than an effect they may have exerted through temporary exchange rate movements.

52. Pharmaceutical traders estimated that market shares of medicines retailed in Afghanistan were: medicines from India, 45 per cent; medicines from Pakistan, 25 per cent; and medicines originating in the Islamic Republic of Iran, China and Korea, 30 per cent. Prior to August 1999, one route for import of medicines was via Ariana cargo flights from Amritsar to Kabul. In August of 1999, the Government of India withdrew permission for Ariana flights to Amritsar, and the imposition of resolution 1267 (1999) in November 1999 generalized this decision. However, alternative routes exist for import from India: container by sea to Karachi, and then through Pakistan by road to Afghanistan. The fact that Indian drugs maintain a significant presence on the retail market indicates that traders have been able to switch to supply by surface. Traders complain that the long delays and formalities involved in the surface route have imposed higher costs than when they had the facility of direct import by air.

53. Thus the main burden of the sanctions has been felt in terms of increased administrative costs and difficulties, rather than in a reduction of the medicine supply.

J. Effectiveness of the humanitarian exemptions mechanism

54. The conclusion contained in my previous report (S/2001/241), that humanitarian exemptions were working smoothly and had avoided excessive delays or cancellation of humanitarian activities, remains broadly applicable. The only delays to humanitarian activities that have been noted have arisen from restrictions not anticipated in the sanctions resolutions.

55. Since March 2001, the United Nations Coordinator's Office for Afghanistan has forwarded 47 applications for agency exemption from the flight ban to the Sanctions Committee. A total of three refusals were received, all of them with regard to established Pakistani non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based in Peshawar. The refusal is not thought to have immediate logistical consequences for these agencies because of the alternatives to air transport.

56. A total of 11 consignments of demining equipment were cleared for transport to Afghanistan without refusals or unreasonable delays. Coordination of the demining clearances proved easy since all operational agencies involved in demining work under the umbrella provided by the United Nations Coordinator's Office, which took responsibility for clearances.

57. A series of complaints were received from Pakistani NGOs based in Peshawar and operating cross-border to eastern Afghanistan. They experienced problems with the Pakistani authorities in obtaining clearances for road travel. The Pakistani authorities had notified these NGOs officially that they should apply for Security Council exemptions, although no air travel was intended or requested. The Pakistani authorities appear not to distinguish between clearance for air transport and clearance for transport by road. The persistence of this problem suggests the need for the Sanctions Committee to clarify to the authorities of neighbouring countries the exact scope of their obligations under the United Nations sanctions.

K. The sanctions regime and Afghan society

1. Popular perceptions of sanctions

58. Through interviews conducted in Kabul and surrounding areas, the monitoring process has undertaken an assessment of the extent of popular knowledge, awareness and perceptions with regard to the United Nations sanctions. The findings should be taken as an initial indication of the nature of popular perceptions, subject to the constraints and difficulties of obtaining accurate information in contemporary Afghanistan.

59. Awareness of the United Nations sanctions is high, which apparently reflects the sustained Taliban-led campaign to highlight the measures. The accuracy of people's knowledge with regard to the content of the sanctions measures is also surprisingly high as well, which perhaps reflects the monitoring focus on Kabul to date. Almost everyone was aware of the ban on international flights to Afghanistan and the restrictions on travel by Taliban senior officials. On all other issues there was at least a two-thirds awareness of the nature of the measures (what is and what is not included in the sanctions regime).

60. In terms of the key issue of whether the Afghan population believes there are adverse humanitarian consequences, 83 per cent of the people interviewed believed that sanctions do cause some element of suffering for the Afghans, but only 33 per cent claimed to suffer from such adverse effects themselves.[1] People have little confidence in the ability of sanctions to achieve any political progress.

61. It is noteworthy that 85 per cent of the persons interviewed consider sanctions a source of shame. They feel personally or nationally insulted by the imposition of United Nations sanctions, which contributes to a general sense of international isolation and abandonment.

62. These results indicate that, on one level, the public information initiative in the Taliban-controlled media seems to have been effective in making sure that everyone knows about sanctions and that most expect there to be adverse humanitarian consequences. This contributes to a difficult environment, within which the United Nations, including the humanitarian agencies, must operate.

63. The lack of activity of the United Nations in the domain of public information on sanctions, particularly using media accessible to Afghans, is therefore an issue of concern. In a period during which the Taliban has clearly prioritized projecting information on the sanctions issue, and has directly attacked the neutrality of the United Nations, there are no efforts from the Organization to project and disseminate a United Nations perspective, countering disinformation, or countering sanctions-related attacks on the United Nations.

2. Impact of sanctions on minority communities

64. The Hindu and Sikh communities were identified as a particular vulnerable group. These communities have recently attracted attention over reported plans by the Taliban authorities to enforce the wearing of a distinctive badge. Since 1992, the communities have expressed concerns over their security and that of their property. There is an overall hostile environment in Afghanistan for these communities that is leading to their rapid disappearance. Community leaders reported that the number of Hindu and Sikh families has fallen from 3,000 in 1992, to 570 in 2001. The communities were previously settled in Kabul, Nangarhar, Khost, Ghazni, Kandahar and Kunduz Provinces, but now mostly remain only in Kabul, Jalalabad and Khost.

65. These communities have traditionally maintained strong cultural and commercial links with India, which were largely serviced via the Ariana flights to India, up to August 1999. A high proportion of the Hindus and Sikhs depended for their livelihoods on trading activities with India, in particular medicine imports and dried fruit exports.

66. In view of the special dependence of these communities on the air link to India, the Sanctions Committee should consider clarifying the fact that the exemption on the flight ban for fulfilment of religious obligation, which has hitherto only been invoked for the Muslim Haj, is also open to groups of Hindus and Sikhs wishing to participate in major religious festivals in India. It would then be up to members of these minority communities, through the Taliban Ministry of Religious Affairs, to approach the Sanctions Committee with any specific proposal for pilgrimages to India. The Sanctions Committee could then offer case-by-case exemptions from the flight ban under the existing provision for religious obligations.

L. Conclusions and recommendations

67. The results of the monitoring process indicate that there are adverse humanitarian effects from the current sanctions regime. But these effects are limited, and their scope and magnitude is greatly exceeded by the effects of the other factors causing humanitarian suffering, most notably the unprecedented drought, the continuation of the conflict and the widespread deprivation of human rights.

68. The clearest direct effects of the United Nations sanctions are still on civil aviation, through the reduced ability of the national airline to operate its planes, maintain safety, generate employment and income and render services. A simple technical solution has been developed for certification of requests by Ariana Afghan Airlines for exemptions from the aviation sanctions. This should be implemented immediately to enable the company to address its maintenance problems.

69. There are also some effects for the investment climate in Afghanistan, with sanctions constituting a contributory factor in deterring investors, thus limiting the generation of livelihoods.

70. Humanitarian exemption mechanisms have worked relatively well and agencies have faced no delays or obstacles arising directly out of the sanctions measures. With regard to exemptions of humanitarian agencies from the aviation restrictions, the Sanctions Committee should intervene with the Pakistani authorities to explain the limitations of the air ban and agency exemption procedures, and request them not to make other privileges conditional on being exempted by the United Nations first.

71. With regard to the frozen overseas accounts of Ariana Afghan Airlines, the Sanctions Committee should consider granting supervised access to these assets for approved maintenance work and crew training, in line with the mechanism already established for use of the over-flight revenues.

72. There is extensive public information regarding sanctions available to the Afghan population, most of it originating from Taliban sources, articulating their viewpoint and promoting their idea that there are widespread humanitarian effects from sanctions, something which is believed by most Afghans. There is a clear need for the United Nations to be more proactive in providing public information regarding sanctions, and ensuring that this is accessible to the Afghan population.

Notes

[1] Interviews were conducted in Kabul and surrounding areas, between March and May 2001, across a broad section of social categories: total number of people interviewed, 287.

United Nations A/56/184–S/2001/696

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Item 179 of the preliminary list*
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 13 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw you attention to the latest incidents in the ongoing Palestinian campaign of terrorism against Israel.

Yesterday evening, Yehezkel Mualem, age 49 and father of four, was seriously wounded by Palestinian gunmen near Givat Haharsina. Mualem died overnight as a result of his wounds. A second Israeli was moderately wounded in the attack.

In a separate attack yesterday, David Cohen, age 31, was critically wounded by Palestinian gunmen firing from a passing vehicle. Cohen died of his wounds this morning in Jerusalem.

Also yesterday, three members of an Israeli family were wounded by Palestinian gunfire shortly after 9.30 am (local time) when their vehicle was ambushed and riddled with bullets. Erez Shmuleyan was seriously wounded in the head, while his wife, Ilanit and their seven-month-old son, Elisha were lightly wounded by shards of glass and bullet fragments.

In the northern Israeli city of Afula, alert police officers thwarted a suicide bombing yesterday when they spotted a suspicious individual clutching a bag to his chest. Officers were able to stop the man and prevent him from detonating the deadly contents of the bag, which was packed with nails and explosives.

Various other incidents of Palestinian gunfire aimed at Israeli civilians were reported yesterday in one of the most violent days in recent weeks. In total, six Israelis were wounded and two were killed.

These attacks are merely the latest in a more than nine-month campaign of Palestinian terrorism that has been detailed in my letters dated 3 July 2001 (A/56/138-S/2001/662), 21 June 2001 (A/56/119-S/2001/619), 19 June 2001 (A/56/98-S/2001/611), 18 June 2001 (A/56/97-S/2001/604), 13 June 2001 (A/56/92-S/2001/585), 11 June 2001 (A/56/91-S/2001/580), 4 June 2001 (A/56/85-S/2001/555), 30 May 2001 (A/56/81-S/2001/540), 25 May 2001 (A/56/80-

* A/56/50.

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S/2001/524), 18 May 2001 (A/56/78-S/2001/506), 11 May 2001 (A/56/72-S/2001/473), 9 May 2001 (A/56/69-S/2001/459), 1 May 2001 (A/55/924-S/2001/435), 23 April 2001 (A/55/910-S/2001/396), 16 April 2001 (A/55/901-S/2001/364), 28 March 2001 (A/55/863-S/2001/291), 27 March 2001 (A/55/860-S/2001/280), 26 March 2001 (A/55/858-S/2001/278), 19 March 2001 (A/55/842-S/2001/244), 5 March 2001 (A/55/821-S/2001/193), 2 March 2001 (A/55/819-S/2001/187), 14 February 2001 (A/55/787-S/2001/137), 13 February 2001 (A/55/781-S/2001/132), 2 February 2001 (A/55/762-S/2001/103), 25 January 2001 (A/55/748-S/2001/81), 23 January 2001 (A/55/742-S/2001/71), 28 December 2000 (A/55/719-S/2000/1252), 22 November 2000 (A/55/641-S/2000/1114), 20 November 2000 (A/55/634-S/2000/1108), and 2 November 2000 (A/55/540-S/2000/1065).

These attacks have only been possible due to the persistent refusal of the Palestinian leadership to take any concerted action to prevent them. Convicted terrorists continue to roam the streets, free to plan and carry out terrorist attacks at their discretion. Palestinian gunmen enjoy near-complete freedom of movement and action, enabling them to target Israeli civilians at will.

Israel again calls on the Palestinian leadership to prevent any further deterioration of the situation by immediately acting to bring an end to the violence and terrorism by re-incarcerating convicted terrorists and ceasing the constant incitement in the official Palestinian media.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under item 179 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yehuda **Lancry**
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/ES-10/96–S/2001/697

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 13 July 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Israel, the occupying Power, persists with its bloody military campaign against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. In the early hours of today (Palestine time), in a sharp escalation of violence and in gross violation of the ceasefire agreement, Israeli tanks entered and shelled an area under full Palestinian control in the city of Al-Khalil (Hebron). The Israeli shelling was indiscriminate and caused a large number of injuries, as well as intense panic and fear among the residents. The shelling resulted in the vast destruction of Palestinian property, including the destruction of a power station, a Palestinian police station and homes belonging to Palestinian civilians.

Furthermore, Israeli settlers, who have been illegally transferred by the occupying Power to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, in grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and in total violation of relevant Security Council resolutions, continued with their atrocities against Palestinian civilians, property and crops. In a serious and dangerous development, Israeli settlers torched homes, shops and orchards belonging to the Palestinian residents in Al-Khalil (Hebron).

Today, in what appears to be yet another extrajudicial killing of Palestinians perpetuated by the Israeli occupying forces, a car was set to explode using a remote control device, instantly killing Fawaz Badran El-Shayeb in the town of Tulkaram. This comes in spite of worldwide condemnation of the Israeli criminal policy of targeted assassinations.

Yesterday, Israeli occupying forces rolled in tanks and shelled the city of Nablus. In addition to causing destruction and devastation to Palestinians and their property, this attack claimed the life of a Palestinian police officer and seriously injured scores of Palestinian civilians. We hold the Israeli government of Mr. Ariel Sharon responsible for the above-mentioned war crimes and State terrorism

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committed by the Israeli occupying forces as well as by the illegal settlers against our people.

Since my last letter to you, dated 11 July 2001 (A/ES-10/95-S/2001/686), I regret to inform you that Israeli occupying forces have killed 2 more Palestinians, including the above-mentioned martyr, bringing the total number of Palestinian martyrs to 519. (The names of the martyrs are contained in the annex to the present letter.) At the same time, the total number of Palestinian civilians injured, many severely and permanently, also continues to rise each day.

Moreover, I am writing this letter in follow-up to my previous 55 letters addressed to you on this grave matter, dated from 29 September 2000 to 11 July 2001 (A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116; A/ES-10/48-S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1206; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7; A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33; A/ES-10/56-S/2001/50; A/ES-10/57-S/2001/101; A/ES-10/58-S/2001/131; A/ES-10/59-S/2001/156; A/ES-10/60-S/2001/175; A/ES-10/61-S/2001/189; A/ES/10-/64-S/2001/209; A/ES-10/65-S/2001/226; A/ES-10/66-S/2001/239; A/ES-10/67-S/2001/255; A/ES-10/68-S/2001/284; A/ES-10/69-S/2001/295; A/ES-10/70-S/2001/304; A/ES-10/71-S/2001/314; A/ES-10/72-S/2001/332; A/ES-10/75-S/2001/352; A/ES-10/76-S/2001/372; A/ES-10/79-S/2001/418; A/ES-10/80-S/2001/432; A/ES-10/81-S/2001/447; A/ES-10/82-S/2001/463; A/ES-10/83-S/2001/471; A/ES-10/84-S/2001/479; A/ES-10/85-S/2001/486; A/ES-10/86-S/2001/496; A/ES-10/87-S/2001/504; A/ES-10/88-S/2001/508; A/ES-10/89-S/2001/544; A/ES-10/90-S/2001/586; A/ES-10/91-S/2001/605; A/ES-10/92-S/2001/629; A/ES-10/93-S/2001/657; A/ES-10/94-S/2001/669 and A/ES-10/95-S/2001/686).

We call upon the international community and the United Nations Security Council in particular to undertake the necessary measures to bring an end to Israel's bloody military campaign against the Palestinian people, as well as to ensure compliance with international law, international humanitarian law and existing Palestinian-Israeli agreements.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nasser **Al-Kidwa**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 13 July 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem* (Thursday, 12 July, through Friday, 13 July 2001)

Thursday, 12 July 2001

Mohammed Abu Fayad

Friday, 13 July 2001

Fawaz Badran El-Shayeb

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* Total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 = 519.

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda items 40 and 41

The situation in the Middle East

Question of Palestine

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 12 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have pleasure in enclosing the press communiqué of the twenty-fourth special session of the Ministerial Council of the Cooperation Council for the Gulf Arab States, which was held at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 11 July 2001 (see annex).

I would appreciate your issuing the communiqué as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 40 and 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jassim M. **Buallay**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 12 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

Press communiqué issued by the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council at its twenty-fourth special session, held in Jeddah on 11 July 2001

On Wednesday, 11 July 2001, the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) held its twenty-fourth special session in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, under the chairmanship of His Excellency Sheikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Bahrain and Chairman-in-Office of the Ministerial Council.

The Ministerial Council reviewed with great concern the deterioration in the situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a result of the persistence of the Israeli Government in using savage methods of repression against the insurgent Palestinian people and of the continued imposition of the policy of closures and sieges with all the grave consequences and repercussions to which it gives rise. The Council cautioned in this connection against the possible outcome of remaining silent with regard to a situation that is extremely dangerous for the security and stability of the region as a whole, and it held the Israeli Government fully responsible for the condition in which the peace process finds itself. It is essential to put an end to the grave violations being committed by the Israeli Government against the Palestinian people while ignoring its commitments and undertakings with respect to the peace process and while violating the resolutions that embody international legitimacy, the norms of public international law and the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The Council affirms the importance of rapid and effective action on the part of the international community and the co-sponsors of the peace process, and in particular the United States of America, in order to achieve peace.

The Council voiced its conviction that it is the settlements that constitute the major danger to security and that are preventing its achievement and the advancement of the peace process, as is stated in the Mitchell report. The Council affirmed that the deterioration that is taking place and the current upsurge in violence can essentially be ascribed to the maintenance of the Israeli occupation and to departures from the agreements concluded between the two parties on the basis of the principles of the peace process that were established at the Madrid conference. The Council calls for the siege imposed on the Palestinian people to be lifted and for access to be allowed to financial resources and to employment opportunities for Palestinians so that the Palestinian Authority may achieve the desired results. Burdening the Palestinian side with obligations without a corresponding commitment on the Israeli side cannot be the way to achieve calm and a halt to violence. The Council also deems the presence of effective international monitoring in the areas of tension to be essential.

The Council condemns the policy of escalation and of widening the circle of violence to include neighbouring countries that is being pursued by the Israeli Government. This policy is driving the region to the brink of the abyss and

threatening its security and stability, and it includes Israel's repeated attacks on Lebanon and on Syrian defence installations.

The Council affirmed the need to follow through on and expedite the delivery of Arab financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority so that it can cope with the grave situation and the circumstances imposed upon it.

The Council urges the Follow-up and Action Committee of the League of Arab States to meet on an urgent basis to consider the possibility of convening an emergency meeting of the League of Arab States to consider the situation and the grave consequences it may have.

The Council further expressed its commendation of the results of the tour of the Arab world and Europe made by His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud, Crown Prince, Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and his intensive efforts during the tour to explain the Arab position on current issues and to affirm the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including its right to establish an independent State on its national soil with Jerusalem as its capital.